This paper analyses the welfare performance of a set of five alternative interest rate rules in an open economy stochastic dynamic general equilibrium model with nominal rigidities. A rule with a lagged interest rate term, high feedback on inflation and low feedback on output is found to yield the highest welfare for a small open economy. This result is robust across different degrees of openness, different sources of home and foreign shocks, alternative foreign monetary rules and different specifications for price setting behaviour. The same rule emerges as both the Nash and cooperative equilibria in a two-country version of the model. JEL: E52, E58, F41 * I am grateful for useful comments and suggestions from an anonymous referee and the editors.
Introduction
Recent research on monetary policy has focused on the use of interest rate rules in which the nominal interest rate is adjusted in response to economic conditions. A rule proposed by Taylor (1993) to act as a guide for policymakers setting short-run interest rates has especially attracted widespread interest. "Taylor rules" in general specify that the shortrun interest rate should be altered in response to an increase in inflation and/or a fall in real output below targeted levels. 1 The collection of papers in Taylor (1999a) provide a sample of the different variations on the benchmark Taylor rule analysed in many papers.
Indeed, in his introduction to this volume, Taylor (1999a) suggests that the set of rules used by different authors in the volume is "representative of the degree of disagreement" among researchers. Taylor (1999a) is regarded as a central reference within the literature on monetary policy rules.
In common with much research on monetary policy rules, the papers in the Taylor (1999a) volume are mostly focused on closed economy models. 2 Gali and Gertler (1999) , Taylor(1999a) and the June 1999 special issue of the Journal of Monetary Economics. 2 Only two of the nine papers in the Taylor volume consider open economy models (Ball (1999) and Batini and Haldane (1999) ). In both these papers the models used are linear structures which do not incorporate explicit microeconomic foundations nor do they consider welfare in terms of the utility of a representative agent.
definitive. This is true for instance for the papers by Obstfeld and Rogoff (2002) , Clarida, Gali and Gertler (2002) , Gali and Monacelli (2005) , Devereux and Engel (2003) , Corsetti and Pesenti (2004) and Benigno and Benigno (2003) . All these authors examine cases
where key parameter values, such as the intra-and intertemporal elasticities of substitution, are restricted to specific values. While these authors are able to obtain interesting and clear-cut results relating to the welfare effects of monetary policy, it is important to note that these results are only valid for specific parameter combinations. The results are not valid for more general parameter combinations. By using second-order approximation techniques the analysis in this paper considers the general case with unrestricted parameter values. This implies that intuitions based on results of the papers cited above cannot be applied directly to the model of this paper. Thus, for instance, the optimality of price stabilisation which is emphasised by a number of the above authors, depends crucially on the parameter restrictions imposed in their models. It does not follow that price stabilisation is optimal in the model of this paper. 5 There are some recent papers analysing Taylor rules using models which are not subject to the above described parameter restrictions. Bergin, Shin and Tchakarov (2005) and developed by Sutherland (2002) , and also by Sims (2000) and Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2004) . It is important to note that, while Woodford (2003) and Rotemberg and Woodford (1999) also use secondorder approximations to analyse welfare, the techniques they use are only appropriate for closed economy settings (or heavily restricted open economy settings). It is only the recently developed second-order techniques (which are used in this paper) that are more generally applicable. 5 Sutherland (2006) , who analyses the general case in a static open economy model, has shown that price stabilisation is only optimal in the special cases analysed in many of the above mentioned papers.
Other recent contributions in the closed and open economy literature have also questioned the optimality of price stabilisation. For instance, again using second-order approximation techniques, Benigno and Woodford (2004) have shown that price stabilisation is not optimal when there are shocks to government spending. Benigno (2001) and Devereux (2004) have shown that price stabilisation is not optimal when international financial markets are incomplete. Sutherland's (2004) results show that price stabilisation is not a Nash equilibrium of non-coordinated monetary policy in a two-country world (except in the cases of special parameter combinations analysed by the above authors). Kollmann (2002) have made use of second-order approximation techniques to investigate the welfare effects of monetary policy rules. But these authors do not analyse the set of rules considered in the Taylor (1999a) and large open economies. There is however evidence that the model fits better when goods prices are set in the local currency of the buyer rather than that of the producer.
The closed economy literature also finds a better fit of these models when the model includes some element of backward price-setting. This paper considers extensions of the 6 Batini, Haldane and Millard (2003) omit the first-order terms from the second-order welfare expression, but recent literature shows these terms to be important for an appropriate valuation of welfare. 7 The general structure of the model is also compatible with New Keynesian models of the type for example described by Svensson (2000) . Svensson 
The Taylor Volume Interest Rate Rules
The monetary policy rules analysed in this paper are listed in Table 1 . These rules are taken from the Taylor (1999a) volume, where different authors test the robustness of these rules to different model and parameter specifications. Obviously, the rules in Table 1 whereî t represents the deviation of the nominal interest rate from its steady state level, Y t represents the log-deviation of output from its steady state level,π t represents the log-deviation of the consumer price inflation rate from its steady state level andî t−1
represents the deviation of the lagged nominal interest rate from its steady state level.
Each parameter g j measures the extent to which the interest rate responds to deviations of the variable j from its steady state value. Rotemberg and Woodford (1999) and unlike I and II, places a small weight on output and a relatively high weight on the lagged interest rate. They propose this rule following a welfare analysis that finds significant welfare improvements by allowing the interest rate to respond to lagged values of itself. 9 3 The Model
The model is a variation of the sticky-price general equilibrium structure which has, following the approach developed by Rogoff (1995, 1998) , been often used
in the recent open economy macroeconomics literature. 10 The model consists of two countries, a small home country and a large foreign country, inhabited by a continuum of infinitely lived individual agents who are consumer/producers.
Agents consume a group of differentiated, perishable goods of total measure unity. These goods are indexed by z on the unit interval. Home country agents produce fraction n goods and foreign agents produce 1 − n goods. 11 Each individual agent uses labour effort to produce a single good and is the monopoly supplier of that good. Prices are assumed to be sticky in that some agents cannot immediately respond to economic disturbances by changing prices within the period under consideration. Instead, these agents respond to disturbances by meeting market demand at pre-set prices. The specific form of sluggish price adjustment considered here is that described by Calvo (1983) , which assumes that agents change their prices after time intervals of random length such that an agent is allowed to change the price of his/her good with probability (1 − γ).
The world economy is assumed to be disturbed by a range of stochastic shocks including labour supply shocks and government expenditure shocks originating in both countries.
The home and foreign monetary authorities are assumed to be following a policy which consists of an interest rate rule of the form described in the previous section. Most of 9 It is important to emphasise that none of the five policy rules is intended to be fully optimal within the model described below. The purpose of the papers in the Taylor (1999a) volume is to investigate the robustness of these five rules across a range of different specifications, as is the objective of this paper. 10 See Lane (2001) for a survey of this literature. 11 n will be taken to be small except when considering cooperation between two equal-sized countries, as explained below in Section 7.
the analysis focuses on the choice of monetary policy rule for the home economy when the home economy is small relative to the foreign economy. The welfare performance of each of the five rules is considered for the home economy under: i. different degrees of openness of the home country; ii. for different foreign monetary policies; and iii. for different sources of shocks hitting the home and foreign economies.
The detailed structure of the home country is described below. The foreign country has an identical structure. Where appropriate, foreign real variables and foreign currency prices are denoted with an asterisk.
All agents in the home economy have utility functions of the same form. The utility of agent h is given by
where χ is a positive constant, C is a consumption index defined across all home and foreign goods, M denotes end-of-period nominal money holdings, P is the consumer price index, y (h) is the output of good h and E is the expectations operator. K is a stochastic shock to labour supply preferences which evolves as follows
where ε K is symmetrically distributed over the interval [− , ] with E[ε K ] = 0 and V ar[ε K ] = σ 2 K . An increase in K represents an increase in the marginal disutility of labour and implies a fall in labour supply.
The consumption index C for home agents is defined as
where C H and C F are indices of home and foreign produced goods defined as follows
where φ > 1, c H (i) is consumption of home good i and c F (j) is consumption of foreign good j. The parameter θ is the elasticity of substitution between home and foreign goods. The parameter ν is a measure of openness, ν = 0 is equivalent to a completely The aggregate consumer price index for home agents is
where P H and P F are the price indices for home and foreign goods respectively defined as
The law of one price is assumed to hold. This implies p H (i) = Sp * H (i) and p F (j) = Sp * F (j) for all i and j where an asterisk indicates a price measured in foreign currency and S is the exchange rate (defined as the domestic price of foreign currency). However, note that purchasing power parity does not hold in terms of aggregate consumer price indices, due to the presence of home bias.
It is assumed that international financial trade is restricted to a risk free bond denominated in the currency of the foreign country. 12 Agent h's budget constraint is
12 In much of the recent open economy literature it is standard to assume that international financial markets allow complete consumption risking. However, the modelling of a complete markets structure is problematic in an asymmetric world (such as a small open economy of the type considered here). Any asymmetry implies an asymmetry in the prices of state-contingent assets. Thus, a full analysis of a complete markets structure requires explicit modelling of asset prices. This complication can be avoided, and thus the model can be considerably simplified, by assuming that international financial trade is restricted to non-contingent bonds.
where B(h) is bond holdings, M(h) is money holdings and T is a lump-sum government transfer.
As is standard in much of the literature, individual agents are assumed to have access to a market for state-contingent assets which allows them to insure against the idiosyncratic income shocks implied by the Calvo pricing structure. 13 The pay-off to agent h's portfolio of state-contingent assets is given by R(h).
In order to remove the unit root which arises when international financial trade is restricted to non-contingent bonds, bond holdings are subject to a cost which is related to the aggregate stock of bonds held. The holding cost is represented by the multiplicative term ϕ t in the budget constraint, where
and B is the aggregate holding of bonds by the home population.
Home agents can also hold wealth in the form of a home nominal bond which is not internationally traded but which can be a substitute for the foreign bond amongst home agents. The rate of return on the home nominal bond will be linked to the rate of return on the foreign bond by the generalised uncovered interest rate parity relationship as follows
The home country's government purchases a basket of home goods of per capita amount G t , prints money and makes lump sum transfers, T t . The government budget constraint is
Changes in the money supply are assumed to enter and leave the economy via changes in lump-sum transfers. 13 There is a separate market for state-contingent assets in each country and there is no international trade in state-contingent assets.
Government purchases are subject to stochastic shocks such that G evolves as follows
G . An increase in G will mean an increase in government purchases of the home country and will be treated as a positive real demand shock.
The intertemporal dimension of home agents' consumption choices gives rise to the familiar consumption Euler equation
A similar condition holds for foreign agents.
Individual home demands for representative home good, h, and foreign good, f , are
where
Foreign demands for home and foreign goods have an identical structure to the home demands. Individual foreign demand for representative home good, h, and foreign good, f , are given by
The total demand for home goods is Y = nC H + (1 − n)C * H + nG and the total demand for foreign goods is Y * = nC F + (1 − n)C * F + (1 − n)G * . 14 Prices are assumed to be set in the currency of the producer and to be sticky in that some agents cannot immediately respond to economic disturbances by changing prices within the period under consideration. Instead, these agents respond to disturbances by meeting market demand at pre-set prices. The specific form of sluggish price adjustment considered here is that described by Calvo (1983) , which assumes that agents change their prices after time intervals of random length. In other words, the specific time period between price changes is a random variable. The probability that a given agent changes its price in any particular period is taken to be a constant, (1 − γ). Accordingly the probability that a given agent will leave his/her price at the previous pre-determined level is γ. Given the law of large numbers, the proportion of agents leaving their price levels unchanged is γ, and the proportion (1 − γ) reset their prices at a new optimal level.
All agents who set their price at time t choose the same price, denoted p H,t for the home country. The first-order condition for the choice of prices implies the following
is the period-s output of a home agent whose price was last set in period t. It is possible to rewrite the expression for aggregate home producer prices as follows
As described above, individual agents are assumed to have access to insurance markets which allow them to insure against the idiosyncratic income shocks implied by the Calvo pricing structure. In section 6, two alternative variants of the model are considered, one with backward-looking price setting and the other with local currency pricing.
The foreign economy, except for the fact that it is a large economy (given n is small), has an identical structure to the home economy. The foreign country is assumed to be subject to stochastic shocks to its labour supply such that K * t evolves as follows
where ε K * is symmetrically distributed over the interval [− , ] with E[ε K * ] = 0 and V ar[ε K * ] = σ 2 K * . Similarly, stochastic shocks to the foreign government's purchases take the following form
The main focus of attention in this paper is on the choice of monetary rule for the small home economy. The objective is to compare the set of interest rules in Table 1 . Thus, the model is solved and a measure of welfare is derived for each of the five rules listed in Table 1 .
It is also necessary to specify the behaviour of the foreign monetary authority. The foreign monetary authority is assumed to adopt an interest rate rule of the same general form as the home authority, thuŝ
The values of the feedback coefficients in this policy rule will obviously affect the behaviour of foreign country variables and this, in turn, may have implications for the welfare performance of the alternative monetary rules for the home economy. In the analysis below, it is assumed that the foreign country policy rule is restricted to the set of rules in Table 1 and the welfare comparison between home-country policy rules is conducted separately for each of the five possible foreign monetary rules.
Model Solution
It is not possible to derive an exact solution to the model described above. The model is therefore approximated around a non-stochastic equilibrium (defined as the solution which results when K = K * = G = G * = 1 and σ 2
whereX is the value of variable X in the non-stochastic equilibrium.X is therefore the log-deviation of X from its value in the non-stochastic equilibrium.
Aggregate (per capita) home welfare in period 0 is defined as
where, for simplicity, the utility of real balances is excluded.
A second-order approximation of Ω can be written as follows
where O ( 3 ) contains terms of order higher than two in the variables of the model. 15 Note that the second-order approximation of aggregate utility depends on the first and second moments of consumption, output and prices. In order to analyse aggregate utility, it is necessary to derive second-order accurate solutions for the first moments of the variables of the model. These solutions are obtained numerically using the technique described in Sutherland (2002) . The next section reports numerical solutions to the above model (under a variety of specifications) which allow a comparison to be made between the five rules. The numerical solutions are obtained using the following benchmark set of parameter values: The discount factor β = 0.99, the elasticity of substitution for individual goods φ = 7.66, the elasticity of substitution between home and foreign goods θ = 4 16 , the work effort preference parameter µ = 1.47, the elasticity of intertemporal substi- 15 All log-deviations from the non-stochastic equilibrium are of the same order as the shocks, which (by assumption) are of maximum size . When presenting an equation which is approximated up to order two it is therefore possible to gather all terms of order higher than two in a single term denoted O ¡ 3 ¢ . 16 The empirical literature on the elasticity of substitution between home and foreign goods does not provide any clear guidance on an appropriate value for this parameter. Obstfeld and Rogoff (2000) , in their brief survey of some of the literature, quote estimates ranging between 1. tution ρ = 1, bond holding costs δ = 0.001. The values for β, φ, µ and ρ are taken from Rotemberg and Woodford (1999) . The value for δ (i.e. the parameter determining the costs of bond holdings) is based on the calibration used by Benigno (2001) . The parameter ζ i , which determines the persistence of the shocks, is set at 0.95 and σ i = 0.007 for all four sources of shocks i = K, K * , G, G * . Productivity shocks are assumed to be correlated across countries with a correlation coefficient of 0.25. The government spending shocks are similarly correlated. The size of the small open economy n, is set at 0.001.
Comparison of Policy Rules: Small Country Case
The main objective of this paper is to use the above described open economy model to compare the performance of the set of five Taylor (1999a) rules listed in Table 1 Figure 1 shows the welfare values under each of the five rules for all degrees of economic openness, from ν = 0, which is equivalent to a completely closed economy to ν = 1, which is equivalent to a completely open economy. 17 Figure 1 shows that the interest rule which delivers the highest welfare for all degrees of openness is rule V, the Rotemberg and Woodford (1999) rule. The next best rule, in terms of welfare, is rule I. Rules II and III, (which produce very similar welfare values) produce lower welfare levels than rules V and I, and rule IV performs worst of all in terms of welfare. Figure 1 shows that this welfare ranking is unchanging in the degree of openness of the home economy. The welfare performance of each rule does not seem to vary significantly with the degree of openness.
Benchmark Results

INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE
Note that, when ν = 0, the home economy is completely closed, the results may be compared with the results from closed economy models (Rotemberg and Woodford (1999) , Taylor (1999a Taylor ( , 1999b ). Figure 1 shows that, in the benchmark case, the welfare ranking of these rules in a closed economy matches the welfare ranking in the open economy.
Thus, the differences in the transmission mechanism of monetary policy which arise in the open economy case appear not to affect the welfare ranking of these five rules.
Some of the underlying intuition for the welfare results and other aspects of the performance of these rules may be understood from considering the impact of the different rules on the volatilities of the main macro variables. Table 2 reports the standard deviations (SD) of real output, consumption, the interest rate, the inflation rate and the exchange rate for each policy rule for three different levels of openness of the home economy. The standard deviations of output, the inflation rate and the interest rate are relevant since they indicate how different rules affect the trade-off between output-inflation variability and the trade-off between inflation and interest rate variability. 17 The numerical welfare values reported in Figure 1 and all subsequent tables are measured in units equivalent to the percentage deviation of consumption from the non-stochastic steady state.
INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE
First we compare the original Taylor rule, rule III, with rule IV which has a higher feedback coefficient on real output. Table 2 shows that the standard deviation of real output is lower and that of inflation is higher under rule IV than under rule III. This indicates that raising g Y represents a movement along the 'output-inflation trade-off curve'. Figure 2 is similar to Taylor's policy frontier in the sense that rules that have smaller standard deviations of output tend to have larger standard deviations of inflation and vice versa. Figure 2 shows that moving from rule III to IV, the standard deviation of output falls and the standard deviation of inflation rises.
INSERT FIGURES 2 AND 3 ABOUT HERE
As evident from Table 2 , a higher response coefficient on real output g Y , also leads to an increase in the variability of consumption and of the interest rate compared to rule III. There is greater interest rate variability because the higher feedback coefficient on output induces the interest rate to respond more actively to stabilise output. Movements in the variance of consumption is linked to the variance in the interest rate through the consumption Euler equation, (equation (12)). Figure 3 shows that moving from rule III to IV leads to higher variability in both the interest rate and the inflation rate so that rule III dominates rule IV. Table 2 . Rule I has greater feedback on all variables, Rule II has a larger feedback on output relative to inflation and rule V places a very small weight on output relative to inflation. In comparing rule II with rule V, we are analysing the effects of having a higher weight on output relative to inflation and vice versa. Table   2 and Figure 2 show that these rules also imply movements along the 'output-inflation trade-off curve'. A higher feedback from output implies lower output variability attained at the expense of higher volatility in inflation.
Now consider rules I, II and V in
Rules I, II and V differ from rules III and IV because they include a lagged interest rate term. This implies some degree of interest rate smoothing which in turn, implies that any change in the interest rate has some persistence. Given the forward-looking nature of the model, expectations of a persistent move in the interest rate will imply that any given change in the interest rate has a more powerful effect on variables in the current period.
Thus, the interest rate movements needed to achieve a given degree of macroeconomic stabilisation will be smaller when there is a lagged interest rate term in the rule. This explains why the interest rate variance is lower under rule V, for instance, (where the feedback coefficient on the lagged interest rate is the highest of all the rules). Since the variance of consumption follows movements in the variance of the interest rate, this also implies that the variance of consumption is lower under rule V than the other rules.
This leads to the question of whether there is a trade-off between interest rate volatility and inflation volatility. Taylor (1999b) argues that although the variability of real output and inflation may be reduced by highly aggressive rules, such rules cause the variability of the interest rate to increase considerably. However the results here contradict this conclusion and Figure 3 shows that rules I and V, both highly aggressive rules, give lower interest rate variances than rules III and IV. In fact, rules that do include i t−1 lead to lower interest rate variability than equivalent rules that do not. 18 Notice that the impact of the different rules on the standard deviations reported in Table 2 , and the trade-offs discussed above, is relatively unaffected by the degree of openness of the home economy. This can be seen in Figures 2 and 3 Figure 4 shows that if the feedback coefficient on output is reduced to approximately zero (while holding g π = 1.22 and g i = 1.3), there is scope for some welfare gain, but this gain is trivial in comparison to the welfare difference between rule V and the other rules. Figure 5 shows that there is also some scope for increasing welfare by increasing g π while holding g Y =0.06 and g i =1.3. Within the values for g π plotted, welfare does not reach a maximum, however, it is clear that welfare is very flat and welfare gains are again quite trivial compared to the welfare difference across the five rules. Figure 6 plots welfare Ω against g i , (holding g Y =0.06 and g π =1.22) and shows that a similar story holds for variations in g i . Figures 4, 5 and 6 show that the welfare generated by rule V appears to be close to the maximum that can be achieved with a rule of this form for the benchmark model.
INSERT FIGURES 4, 5 AND 6 ABOUT HERE
The following sub-sections discuss a number of variations of the benchmark case just discussed and show that the welfare ranking is robust across all the variations considered.
The Impact of the Foreign Country's Monetary Policy
The above results have shown that rule V, the Rotemberg and Woodford (1999) Table 3 presents the welfare values for the home country for the five cases where the foreign country follows in turn each of the five rules. Thus the welfare value given in row i, column j in Table 3 is the welfare level for the home economy when the home country follows rule j and the foreign country follows rule i. Table 3 panel A gives the welfare results when ν = 0.5.and panel B shows the results with ν = 1. Table 3A shows that the best policy rule for the home country is always rule V irrespective of the rule followed by the foreign country.
The next best rule is rule I for the home country. The rule leading to the lowest welfare is rule IV. The same pattern can be seen in the case when the home economy is completely open, as shown in Table 3B . Thus, the welfare ranking of rules for the home economy found in the benchmark case appears to be robust across different foreign policy rules.
INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE
Different Sources of Shocks
It has long been recognised that the welfare performance of monetary regimes depends on the source of stochastic shocks hitting the economy. In the benchmark case described above, there is a mixture of four different shocks, home and foreign real supply and demand shocks. In order to see whether the welfare ranking identified in the benchmark case is affected by the balance of shocks, the individual effects of each of the stochastic real shocks are now considered separately.
Simulation results presenting the home welfare levels (for different degrees of openness of the home economy) when home labour supply shocks are the only source of stochastic shocks hitting the two economies have been obtained. 19 These results show that, similar to the benchmark case above, rule V generates the highest welfare, followed by rules I, II, III and IV and that, as in the benchmark case, the degree of openness does not affect the welfare ranking of the rules. The same exercise has been carried out when only stochastic real demand shocks originating from the home country hit the two economies. As with the case with home supply shocks, results show that the comparative welfare ranking of the rules show a similar pattern to the benchmark case. It is again rule V that yields the highest welfare levels, followed by rules I, II, III and IV following. Again, the degree of openness appears to make little difference to the results obtained. 20 Simulation results showing the home welfare levels for each of the five rules are also obtained for the case when foreign labour supply shocks are the only source of stochastic shocks hitting the two economies. In the case where the shocks hitting the two economies originate only from the foreign country, it is important to note that the specific monetary policy rule adopted by the foreign country may have implications for the relative performance of the rules adopted by the home country. For this reason, the relative welfare comparison of the five home policy rules is carried out in turn for each of the five possible rules followed by the foreign economy. Welfare results for the case where ν = 0.5 show that the rule which delivers the highest home welfare is rule I when the foreign country follows rules II, III and IV. 21 Results show that when the home economy is completely open (ν = 1), it is rule V which outperforms the other rules in terms of welfare. The next best rule is I, followed by rules II, III and IV. Thus, in general, the welfare ranking of rules for the home economy found in the benchmark case appears to be robust across different foreign policy rules even when the supply shocks hitting the two economies originate only from the foreign economy. This exercise is repeated for the case of foreign demand shocks.
Results show that the comparative welfare ranking of the rules show a similar pattern to the benchmark case. It is again rule V that delivers the highest welfare levels, with rules I, III and II next. 22 Rule IV again ranks the lowest in terms of home welfare. The degree of openness appears to make little difference to the general pattern of results. 23 
Parameter Variations
Before concluding this section,we briefly consider the extent to which the benchmark results are sensitive to variations in the parameters of the model. Five parameters are likely to be important, namely, θ, ρ, φ, µ and ζ j . The parameter θ, the elasticity of substitution between home and foreign goods is likely to be important because θ is a main determinant of the strength of the expenditure switching effect and it is known that the expenditure switching effect can play a significant role in the welfare comparison between rules. We consider two alternative values for θ, 0.8 and 6. The effects of increasing ρ, which determines the elasticity of intertemporal substitution, to 6 are considered. The parameter φ determines the price elasticity of demand for individual goods, (see equations (13) and (15)). The effects of setting φ to 4 and 12 are considered. The effects of setting µ to 6 is considered which implies a significantly lower elasticity of labour supply than the benchmark value. Finally, we look at the implications of a higher value for ζ i which determines the persistence of stochastic shocks. The effects of increasing the degree of persistence of shocks to ζ i = 0.99 are analysed. Results varying these five parameters (when there is a mixture of four different shocks, home and foreign real supply and demand shocks, as in the benchmark case) indicate that the benchmark results are robust to all the parameter variations carried out. Rule V continues to deliver the highest welfare 22 For a degree of openness ν = 0.5, the ranking of rules II and III switch places, though the difference in welfare levels is quite small. 23 These results are not reported but are available upon request. levels under all three degrees of openness of the home economy. 24 
Alternative Pricing Structures
This section considers two alternative assumptions regarding price-setting and tests the robustness of the welfare ranking of the five rules under each alternative assumption.
Backward-Looking Prices
The Calvo (1983) pricing structure has been subject to criticism because it implies that the inflation rate can adjust very rapidly to shocks. There is in fact extensive empirical evidence suggesting that there is significant inertia in the inflation rate. One way to model sluggish inflation is to allow for some degree of backward-looking behaviour in price setting. It is therefore useful to analyse the robustness of the benchmark welfare results when the benchmark framework is modified to allow some prices to be set in a backward-looking manner. In the benchmark model above, the forward-looking nature of price setting is evident in the first order condition for price setting given in equation (17) .
In this section, the model is modified by assuming that producers set prices as a weighted average of a forward-looking component, p f H,t , and a backward-looking component, p b H,t , such that the new price set in period t is
where α is the weight given to the forward looking component. The forward looking component is determined from the first-order condition (17) and the backward looking component is determined by the following rule of thumb
where 0 < ξ < 1. Thus the backward looking component is determined by the average level of producer prices observed in the previous period, updated by a fraction of the 24 These results are not reported but are available upon request.
observed producer price inflation rate. Figure 7 shows the welfare values under each of the five rules for different values of α, from α = 0, where producers are entirely backward-looking, to α = 1, where producers are entirely forward-looking. Figure 7 shows that as α is reduced (i.e. as producers become more backward looking) the welfare performance of the five rules become very similar.
Nevertheless, the interest rate rule which delivers the highest welfare is again rule V, except for values of α < 0.1. Figure 8 shows the welfare values under each of the five rules for different values of ξ, where ξ measures the degree of indexation in backward-looking
pricing. Figure 8 again shows that rule V yields the highest welfare. 25 INSERT FIGURES 7 AND 8 ABOUT HERE
Exchange Rate Pass-through
The benchmark model is based on the assumption that prices are set in the currency of the producer, i.e. producer currency pricing (PCP). However, Bergin (2004) finds strong empirical support for the alternative price setting structure, that of local currency pricing (LCP), where prices are set in the currency of the buyer. PCP implies full pass-through from exchange rate changes to export prices while LCP implies incomplete pass-through.
Given the empirical support for LCP, it is important to consider the impact of incomplete exchange rate pass-through on the welfare performance of the policy rules using the above model. Incomplete exchange rate pass-through is introduced in the model by allowing each producer to set two prices, one for sales to home consumers, and another for sales to foreign consumers. Each price is assumed to be subject to separate Calvo (1983) style price setting processes. Export prices (i.e. prices for homes sales to foreign consumers and foreign sales to home consumers) are assumed to be subject to a fixed degree of indexation to the nominal exchange rate, denoted η. Thus, η = 0 implies zero pass-through from exchange rate changes to export prices, and η = 1 implies full pass 25 In Figure 7 ξ is set equal to 1 and in Figure 8 α is set equal to 0.5. In both figures ν = 1, which is equivalent to a completely open economy through. 26 Figure 9 shows the welfare values for each of the five rules for different values of η. These results are based on ν = 1. Figure 9 shows that the interest rule which delivers the highest welfare for all degrees of pass-through is again rule V with the ranking of the rules exactly the same as in the benchmark analysis. Table 4 shows the pay-off matrices for the policy game where the pay-offs are the levels of aggregate welfare yielded by combinations of home and foreign policy rules. Table 4 panel A shows the welfare levels for the home economy for the five cases where the foreign country follows each of the five rules and panel B presents the welfare levels for the foreign country for the five cases where the home country follows each of the five rules. (Thus the welfare value given in row i, column j in Table 4A is the welfare level for the home economy when the home country follows rule j and the foreign country follows rule i and similarly 26 In this analysis it is necessary to set the work effort preference parameter (µ) equal to unity. This implies utility is linear in work effort. Solving the model for the case where µ 6 = 1 is technically extremely difficult in the LCP case. Other authors, using models with LCP, have avoided this problem by assuming utility is additively seperable in labour supply to home and foreign markets.
in Table 4 panel B.) The results in Table 4A and B are obtained under the assumption that the degree of openness of the both countries is set at ν = 0.5. Table 5 The home welfare levels reported in Table 4A , shows that irrespective of the policy rule followed by the foreign country, the home country obtains the highest welfare by following rule V. For the foreign country, Table 4B shows that rule V again yields the highest welfare irrespective of the policy rule followed by the home country. In the case where the two economies are completely open (shown in Table 5A ) it is seen that this pattern is repeated and that rule V continues to yield higher welfare levels for each country regardless of policy rule followed by the other.
The results presented in Tables 4 and 5 show that, irrespective of the degree of openness, rule V is a dominant strategy for both countries. Rule V is therefore both a Nash equilibrium and the coordinated equilibrium in a game over the choice of policy rules.
That is, whether the two countries act cooperatively or not, the policy rule which delivers the highest welfare for each country is rule V. As such, these results are in exact accordance with the results of the benchmark case of the small economy analysis. 27 8 Open Economy Interest Rate Rules
The above sections have extended the closed economy analysis of the five Taylor (1999a) rules to an open economy setting and also investigated the robustness of these rules in a variety of different configurations. However, open economy issues such as the behaviour of exchange rates and the importance of the exchange rate as a key transmission mechanism of monetary policy, especially in transmitting the effects foreign shocks, are central to 27 Tables 4 and 5 
INSERT TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE
One key feature of this existing line of the literature is that it is based on ad hoc measures of welfare rather than the utility-based welfare measure used in this paper. It is therefore valuable to re-examine this issue using the current model. Table 6 shows a number of variants of rule V which include the rate of change of the nominal exchange rate with coefficients ranging from -0.1 to -0.5. It is apparent that there is some welfare improvement obtained by including such a term. However, note that the size of the welfare gain is very small and it appears that these welfare gains are possible only if the coefficient on the rate of change of the exchange rate is negative. This implies that stabilising the exchange rate is welfare decreasing rather than welfare increasing.
Another issue which has received some attention in the open economy literature on policy rules is the appropriate definition of inflation to be used in the rule. The benchmark analysis is based on using the consumer price index (CPI). Since one of the fundamental welfare costs of inflation volatility in models, such as the one analysed here, is its impact on relative price distortions across producers, it is often argued that monetary policy in an open economy should aim to stabilise producer price inflation. 28 It is therefore useful to consider an alternative form of rule V which includes PPI inflation rather than CPI inflation. The welfare results of this rule is shown in the final column of Table 6 . It is apparent that the CPI form of rule V delivers marginally higher welfare than the PPI version, but the welfare difference between the two versions of the rule is minimal.
Conclusions
This This limited analysis showed that in this framework no significant welfare improvements were to be obtained. 28 See Kirsanova, Leith and Wren-Lewis (2006) for a detailed analysis of this point. 
